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Introduction
1.1

Background

Capital is defined as the excess of the value of an insurer's assets
over the value of its liabilities. In practice, the value of the assets and
liabilities is reported using statutory and regulatory requirements. Regulatory requirements are used for solvency assessment. Methods of determining economic capital have become the focus of insurers in recent
years. Regulatory capital requirements for banks and insurers increasingly are becoming risk-based to reflect the economic impact of balance
sheet risks. Giese (2003) discusses the concept of economic capital
along with the recent developments in economic capital models.
However determined, capital provides a buffer that allows insurers
to pay claims even when losses exceed expectations or asset returns fall
below expectations. As described by the IAA (International Actuarial
Association) Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party (2004) a level
of capital provides, among other things, a "rainy day fund, so when bad
things happen, there is money to cover it."
Cummins (1988) and Butsic (1994) discuss the need for regulation in
insurance. Butsic (1994) argues that if markets were perfectly efficient,
capital regulation would not be necessary. Insurers could determine
their own level of capital, and market forces would price premiums
depending upon the riskiness of an insurer becoming insolvent. Fully
informed consumers would diversify their insurance policies across insurers taking into account the risk of insurer default. Taylor (1995) and
Sherris (2003) use economy wide models to explore equilibrium insurance pricing and capitalization. Sherris (2003) shows that in a complete
and frictionless market model the level of capital will be reflected in the
market price of premiums for insurance and there is no unique optimal
level of capital for an insurer.
In reality the complete and perfect markets assumptions do not
hold. There is information asymmetry between consumers and insurers. As the costs of insurer insolvency can be significant, insurers do
not report their level of default risk even though this is often assessed
by rating agencies. For this form of market failure, as described by
Frank and Bernanke (2001, pp. 297-312), an efficient way for insurers
to demonstrate financial soundness is to meet regulated levels of capital
prescribed. This regulatory capital serves as protection for consumers
against the adverse effects of insurer insolvency.
Another factor that is important in practice is the existence of government or industry-based guarantee funds that compensate policy-
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holders in the event of insurer insolvency. There is no formal arrangement of guarantee of insurers in Australia. These guarantee funds are
taken into account in considering the risk-based capital that insurers
hold where they exist. They also may generate moral hazard if the cost
of such guarantee funds is not reflected in the premiums charged to
insurers. This is an area that is not addressed in detail in this paper.
If they were to be included in the model, then the capital requirements
would be the requirements after allowing for the government or industry support.
The IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party has developed
a global framework for risk-based capital for insurers. In their 2004
working paper entitled "A Global Framework for Insurer Solvency Assessment," the working party advocates two methodologies for regulatory capital determination: the standard approach and the advanced
approach. The standard approach applies industry wide risk factor
charges to the calculation of the insurer~s capital reqUirement, while
the advanced approach allows insurers to use a dynamic financial analysis (DFA) model to calculate their capital requirement, better reflecting
the insurer's risks.
Banks have been increasingly moving to the use of internal models
for capital requirements under Basel. l Insurers in a number of countries will be faced with similar requirements as regulators adopt a more
risk-based capital approach to regulation. Against this background, the
issues in implementing risk-based capital are of significant interest to
insurers and actuaries at an international level.

1.2

Capital Regulation in Australia

The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) is the primary capital regulator of non-life (property and casualty) insurers in
Australia. APRA reviewed its approach to regulating non-life insurance
companies and recently released a new set of prudential standards.
These standards contain a new methodology for determining a non-life
insurer's minimum capital requirement. The new capital requirements
more closely match regulatory capital to an insurer's risk profile, otherwise known as risk-based capital. 2
1 See

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision papers "Operational Risk" (January

2001), "Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord" (January 2001), and "Working Paper
on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk" (September 2001). Full details are
available from the Bank for International Settlements web site <http://bi 5.0 rg>.

2For further information on the background to the APRA general insurance reform,
refer to Gray (1999 and 2001) and lAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party
(2004).
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Non-life insurers are able to calculate the minimum capital required
in one of two ways:
An insurer may choose one of two methods for determining its minimum capital requirement (MCR). Insurers with
sufficient resources are encouraged to develop an in-house
capital measurement model to calculate the MCR (this is referred to as the internal model based method (IMB)). Use of
this method, however, will be conditional on APRA's and the
Treasurer's prior approval and will require insurers to satisfy a range of qualitative and quantitative criteria. Insurers
that do not use the 1MB method must use the prescribed
method. 3
APRA's prescribed method is in line with the standard approach of
the IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party's, while the 1MB
method is in line with the advanced approach. The solvency benchmark
for the new APRA standards is a maximum probability of insolvency in
a one year time horizon of 0.5%.
The IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party considers that
the prescribed method should produce a more conservative (higher)
value for the minimum capital requirement, as it should determine a
minimum level applicable to all insurers licensed to conduct business.
The 1MB method should produce a lower minimum capital requirement
but would only be available as a capital calculation methodology to
larger, more technically able insurers with effective risk management
programs.

1.3

The Purpose of this Study

This paper presents the results of a case study of the assessment
of regulatory capital for non-life insurers in Australia. The case study
highlights the issues involved in determining the capital requirements
advocated by the IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party and
demonstrates the challenges of the internal model based approach for
insurers. It also highlights shortcomings of the prescribed method. The
comparative levels of capital required under the prescribed method and
the 1MB method are important for insurers considering the use of internal model-based methods. Regulators adopt an approach such that
insurers using either method should meet minimum levels of capital
3APRA's Prudential Standard GPS llO.
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that ensure a consistent probability of insolvency across different insurers. This may have shortcomings when the probability of ruin over
a single year horizon is used as a risk measure. In practice most insurers that develop internal models will consider risk measures that take
into account the ruin probability and the severity of ruin. It is also important to consider longer horizons than the one year adopted by the
regulators and used in this study.
Our study aims to compare the MCRs under the two methodologies. 4 In order to do this we use techniques that insurers would use
in practice. The approach used is as follows. We develop a model of
a typical, large non-life insurer with five business lines: (i) domestic
motor, (ii) household, (iii) fire and industry-specific risk (ISR) , (iv) public liability, and (v) compulsory third party (CTP) insurance. A dynamic
financial analysis (DFA) model is used for the 1MB method capital requirement, and this is compared to capital levels calculated under the
prescribed method. The DFAmodel is used to allocate capital to each
of the risks considered using a method adopted by practitioners. The
model insurer's business mix, asset mix and business size are changed
to examine the effect on capital requirements.
The main results of the analysis are as follows: Based on the liability
volatility assumptions developed by leading industry consultants, the
1MB method was found to produce a higher MCR than the prescribed
method. From the insurer's perspective, this indicates a possible incentive to use the prescribed method in practice. It was also found
that the prescribed method capital requirements were inadequate to
ensure a ruin probability in one year of less than 0.5% for the entire
general insurance industry. This illustrates the difficulty in developing
prescribed method requirements that reflect insurer differences.
Finally, the liability volatility assumptions have a Significant impact
on the results produced by the internal model. There was no consensus
on insurance liability volatility assumptions suitable for capital requirements for the Australian business. Consulting firms had developed and
published estimates using their own experience and knowledge. A rigorous study is required to quantify these assumptions more precisely.
This is an important area for future research. The assumptions adopted
in this study and examined for sensitivity, however, are the best estimates available.
From an international perspective this study identifies challenges
for risk-based capital requirements in insurance. Prescribed methods,
although easier to apply, are more difficult to develop, especially if con4Readers are referred to Collings (2001) and IAA Insurer Solvency Working Party
(2004) for prior work in this area.
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sis tent treatment of different insurers is important. On the other hand,
implementing internal model-based capital requirements requires that
the issue of the calibration of models and consistency in assumptions
used for different classes of business be properly addressed. An internal model can deal with the many interactions between the assets and
liabilities and many of the most important risks, but this will only be
the case if the models are based on a sound estimation of risks from
actual data. This is an area that requires attention before regulators
can use this approach with the confidence that is necessary for such an
important aspect of insurer risk management.

2

The Prophet DFA Model

This study uses a DFA model to determine the capital requirement
under the 1MB method. The DFA model used was developed using
Prophet, a DFA software package produced by Trowbridge Consulting.
The Prophet DFA model is used by several large non-life insurers in Australia for internal management purposes. Other DFA software packages
commonly used in the Australian non-life insurance industry include
Igloo (developed by The Quantium Group), Moses (developed by Classic
Solutions) and TASPC (developed by Tillinghast Towers-Perrin Consulting). Although these various software packages have different features,
we do not expect significant differences in the results from using a different DFA software package based on the simplified assumptions used
in the model.
The Prophet DFA model calibrated for this study uses typical assumptions for this purpose. It was not developed to meet the requirements for approval by APRA and the Treasurer for use in the 1MB method.
The Prophet model is broadly representative of current industry best
practice in general insurance DFA modeling.

2.1

Description

The Prophet DFA model consists of an economic model and an insurance model. The key interaction between the two models is inflation,
which affects both the asset returns in the economic model and the
claims and expenses in the insurance model. We describe the main features of the DFA model for completeness. Other models will differ in
details but are broadly similar to the model described here.
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The Economic Model

Prophet uses The Smith Model® (TSM®) to model the economic environment. TSM® is a proprietary economic model that forecasts a
range of economic variables including bond yields, equity returns, property returns, inflation and the exchange rate. The key features of the
model are that TSM® ensures that all initial prices and projections are
arbitrage-free and that markets are efficient. Historical data are used to
calibrate TSM® to derive the necessary parameters for the projections,
including the risk premium and covariance matrix parameters that ensure efficiency in markets. 5 We should emphasize that we are not advocating the use of any particular model or software. We use typical
software and assumptions as would be used by an insurer in practice in
order to assess the impact of capital requirements and to draw conclusions about the alternate approaches. The economic model used may
impact the results through the assumptions made about inflation and
how this is incorporated into the liability model.
2.1.2 The Insurance Model
The insurance model is dis aggregated into separate models for each
of the insurer's business lines' liabilities. Assets, liabilities not relating
to a specific line, and interactions between business lines are modeled
at the insurer entity level.
Opening Financial Position: The opening financial position for the insurer is an input and covers the details of the insurer's liabilities
and assets. From this opening position projections are simulated
for the insurer's asset returns, claims for each business line, expenses, and reinsurance recoveries.
Asset Returns: Asset returns are projected based on the assumed asset
allocation and the simulations from the economic model.
Claims: There are four stochastic claims processes in the model: runoff claims (outstanding claims); new attritionallosses; new large
claims; and new catastrophe claims. Attritional and large claims
are modeled separately for each business line, while catastrophe
claims are modeled by the catastrophe event.
• Run-off Claims: The opening value for the outstanding claims
reserve equals the expected discounted value of the inflated
5For further details on The Smith Model· visit <http://thesmi thmode 1 . com>.
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run-off claims. The expected run-off claims are input into
the model in the form of a run-off triangle. For each accident
year the run-off claims are assumed to follow a lognormal
distribution with a variance parameter for each business line
and each accident year as input into the model.
Run-off patterns used in DFA model case study also are available from the authors. These were developed from assumed
industry run-off patterns. A summary of the key factors is
given in Table 1.
Table 1
Cumulative Payment Development
Patterns by Business Line (Uninflated)
Business Line
Period Motor Home F&ISR Pub. Liab.
20%
1
81%
11%
86%
2
100%
98%
90%
23%
100%
99%
95%
37%
3
4
100%
99%
98%
54%
99%
5
100% 100%
69%
6
100% 100% 100%
81%
7
100% 100% 100%
88%
92%
8
100% 100% 100%
9
100% 100% 100%
95%
10
100% 100% 100%
97%
11
100% 100% 100%
98%
100%
12
100% 100%
99%
13
100% 100% 100%
99%
14
100% 100% 100%
99%
15
100% 100% 100%
100%

CTP
5%
11%
24%
41%
59%
73%
82%
88%
93%
96%
98%
99%
99%
100%
100%

Notes: Period = Development Period. F&[SR = Fire & [SR.
Pub. Liab. = Public Liability.

• New Attritional Losses: Ultimate attritionallosses from new
claims are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. with a
specified payment pattern. Inflation and superimposed inflation also are included. Correlations between business lines
are modeled by a specified correlation matrix that is put into
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the model. Parameters for attritionallosses are given in Table
2.

Table 2
Attritional Claims Parameters
Lognormal Distribution Claims as a Percentage of GEP
Motor Home F&ISR Pub. Liab.
CTP
f.1

(T

-25.4%
22.4%

-81.7%

-70.8%

-74.8%

30.6%
26.0%
27.0%
Notes: F&[SR = Fire & [SR, Pbl. Liab. = Public Liability.

-36.3%
20.9%

• New Large Claims: A collective risk model is used to model
large claims. The frequency of claims is modeled as a Poisson
process, and a lognormal distribution is used to model large
claims severity as, for example, in Klugman, Panjer, and Willmot (1998, Chapter 4, pp. 291-384). Let Kf be the number of
large claims for business line i, Xfk the size of the kth large
is the aggregate large claims for
claim in business line i,
business line i with

Zf

Kf ~ Poisson (Ad
Xfk ~ Lognormal (f.1i'

(Tn

Kf

zf = I

Xfk

k=l

and parameter values given in Table 3. The assumptions
for the large claims payment pattern, inflation and superimposed inflation are identical to those used in the modeling of
attritional claims.
• New Catastrophe Claims: Catastrophe claims are modeled
based upon similar principles to the collective risk model
with some modifications. Four catastrophe types are modeled separately. For each catastrophe, a Poisson frequency
process was used to model the number of catastrophe events
per year, and an empirical distribution was used to model the
claim severity from the event. For each event, there is a primary and a secondary severity process modeled, with the primary process being larger than the secondary process. The

14
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Table 3
Poisson Frequency and Lognormal
Fire & ISR Public Liability
A
0.53
1.36
/.1
7.72
8.22
()
0.46
0.25
Notes: F&ISR = Fire & ISR, Pbl. Liab.

Severity
CTP
1.42
8.67
0.22

Public Liability.

=

key difference between the modeling of large and catastrophe claims is that catastrophes are considered as events and
are not specific to any business line. We assume

KJ ~ Poisson (Aj)
XJk ~ Empirical Distribution
YjS I XJk ~ Empirical Distribution.
Each business line is assigned a fixed percentage of either the
primary severity or the secondary severity for each catastrophe type.
PCij

=

pJ

SCij

=

SJ X Bi

X

Ai

where PCij is the aggregate primary claims for business line
i from catastrophe type j, 100Ai% of primary severity for
is the aggregate primary severity for catasbusiness line i,

pJ

KJ
trophe type j which equals

2::

k=l

XJk' SCi} is the aggregate sec-

ondary claims for business line i from catastrophe type j,
100Bi% of secondary severity for business line i,

KJ

SJ = I

k=l

YjS

I XJk

is the aggregate secondary severity for catastrophe type j,

Kf is the number of catastrophe events for catastrophe type
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kth
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event for catastro-

phe type j, and Yj~ I XJk is the secondary severity of the kth
event for catastrophe type j. Estimated parameters for the
catastrophe model used in the base case DFA model are as
follows:
- for the small catastrophe claims parameters the Poisson
frequency was i\. = 4.3 and mean and standard deviation
of the empirical severity of GEP were 0.88% and 0.43%,
respectively, and
- the impact to each line of business as percentage of severity was motor (50%), home (100%), and Fire & ISR (190%).
The other parameters used are given in Table 4.

Type
1
1
2
2

3
3

Table 4
Large Catastrophe Type Claims:
Parameter Impact on Each Business Line
Motor Home Fire & ISR
%Primary Severity
6
8
% Secondary Severity 64.6
%Primary Severity
9
8
% Secondary Severity
1.6
% Primary Severity
84
85
% Secondary Severity 33.8

Expenses: There are three categories of expenses in the model: acquisition expense; commission; and claims handling expense. Acquisition expense and commission are expressed as a fixed percentage
of premiums. Claims handling expense is a fixed percentage of
claims. Expenses vary across business lines.
Reinsurance: The model allows for individual excess of loss (XoL) reinsurance to cover large claims and catastrophe reinsurance to cover
catastrophes. Proportional reinsurance is not explicitly modeled,
so in effect attritional claims can be viewed to be net of proportional cover. For both reinsurance contracts there is a cost of
cover, a deductible amount, an upper limit, and a specified number of reinstatements for the contract.
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Key Interactions and Correlations

An important aspect of DFA modeling is accounting for the many interactions and correlations between variables in the model. It is particularly important when considering the tail-end of the distribution of insurance outcomes given that extreme losses are often driven by several
variables behaving unfavorably. For example, a one in two hundred year
loss for an insurer could occur when both a catastrophe event causes
very high insurance claims and at the same time asset markets underperform. In the Prophet DFA model there are four key interactions that
are modeled: between assets and liabilities; claims and expenses; attritional claims across business lines; and between catastrophe claims
across business lines.
Relationship between Assets and Liabilities: Inflation is important in
the relationship between assets and liabilities. Consumer price
index (CPI) and average weekly earnings (AWE) inflation are projected by TSM®. Inflation impacts asset returns, as TSM® assumes
markets are efficient and incorporates a risk premium and covariance matrix to relate inflation with other asset prices. The impact
of TSM"'s projected inflation on liabilities is through claims inflation in the insurance model.
Relationship between Claims and Expenses: Claims handling expenses are modeled as a fixed percentage of claims. Thus, claims
handling expenses are perfectly correlated with claims incurred.
Relationship between Attritional Claims across Business Lines: A correlation matrix is specified to model the relationship between the
attritional claims of different business lines. The parameter values for the correlation matrix (based on the Tillinghast study) used
for the DFA study base case are given in Table S. This gives the Pi}
for the correlation between line of business i and line of business
j.
Relationship between Catastrophe Claims across Business Lines: As
catastrophes are modeled as events that can impact multiple business lines, there exists a correlation between catastrophe claims
across different business lines. For business lines that are impacted by either the primary or secondary severity distribution
of a given catastrophe event, there will be perfect correlation between claims from that catastrophe event. In the case where one
line is impacted by the primary severity distribution and another
is impacted by the secondary severity distribution, there will be a
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Parameter Values
Motor
Motor
1.00
0.75
Home
0.40
Fire & ISR
Public Liability
0.00
CTP
0.55

Table 5
for the Correlation Matrix
Home F&ISR Pub. Liab.
0.75
0.40
0.00
1.00
0.35
0.00
0.35
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.00
0.00
0.35

Notes: F&ISR = Fire & ISR, Pub. Liab.

=
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CTP
0.55
0.00
0.00
0.35
1.00

Public Liability.

positive correlation (but less than one). Lines that are not affected
by a given catastrophe event will have zero correlation with lines
that are affected. Modeling of dependence in insurance is a topic
of current research. We have not included more detailed models
of dependence in this case study. We aimed to use current industry practice which is currently largely based on correlations.
Even using correlations is problematic because there is no current
agreement on the assumptions to use.

3

The Data and DFA Model Assumptions
The data sources used to create the model insurer came from:
• APRA's June 2002 Selected Statistics on the General Insurance Industry (APRA statistics);
• Tillinghast's report "Research and Data Analysis Relevant to the
Development of Standards and Guidelines on Liability Valuation
for General Insurance;"
• Trowbridge's report "APRA Risk Margin Analysis;"
• Allianz Australia Insurance Limited (Allianz);
• Promina Insurance Australia Limited (Promina); and
• Insurance Australia Group Limited (lAG).

The model insurer created is not representative of any of the insurers that provided data for the study. Full details of the model assumptions are provided in Sutherland-Wong (2003) and available from the
authors on request. Brief details are provided below.

18
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The following data items were used for the model insurer:
Number of Business Lines: Five business lines were included. This
was considered large enough for an in-depth analysis without unduly complicating the analysis. To ensure a broad mix of business
lines, two of the five were chosen to be short tail (Domestic Motor
and Household), two long tail (Public Liability and CTP), and one
of intermediate policy duration (fire and ISR). The largest business
lines from the APRA statistics (by gross written premium) for each
of these categories were chosen.
Size of Business Lines: The business size was set so that the model
insurer had a 10% market share from the APRA statistics (by gross
written premiums) in each business line.
Expected Claims: The expected claims for each line of business were
set to a level to produce an expected afterctax return of 15% on
capital based on an assumed capital level of 1.5 times the MCR
calculated under the prescribed method. The payment pattern,
premium assumptions, and inflation assumptions were used to
solve for the expected claims for each business line to meet this
target.
Claims Volatility: The volatility assumption used for each business line
determines the insurance outcome at the 99.5 th percentile and
therefore directly impacts the MCR. Rather than using individual
insurer data for these assumptions, we used statistics that were
more representative of the broader Australian general insurance
industry.
The Tillinghast and Trowbridge reports both include estimates of
the coefficients of variation (CVs) of the insurance liabilities of the
Australian general insurance industry. The reported CVs in these
reports were vastly different, however, with the Tillinghast numbers being generally twice as large as the Trowbridge numbers.
Table 6 provides details of CVs used in this DFA case study based
on the Tillinghast report.
Thomson (2003) outlines the initial risk margins that insurers
have adopted since the new standards came in force from July
2002. He reports that for short tail lines, insurers were generally
aligned with the lower Trowbridge numbers. For 101l1S tail lines,
the numbers were consistently lower than the Tillinghast report.
There was a great deal of variation in the risk margins adopted
within each business line, however, suggesting that there is no
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Table 6
Liability CVs by Business Line
Type of Liability CV
Outstanding Claims Premium
Motor
Home
Fire & ISR
Public Liability
CTP

12.4%

21.7%

18.9%

33.1%
28.4%

18.9%
23.7%

29.6%

21.8%

27.2%

real consensus among the industry on the appropriate level for
risk margins. It generally would be in the interest of insurers to
adopt lower risk margins in order to report a lower liability value
and also a lower capital requirement.
The Tillinghast numbers were used in the analysis, as they represented a more conservative view of variability in the industry.
The Trowbridge numbers were used as an alternative scenario in
the analysis to determine the impact of these assumptions.
Payment Pattern: The payment pattern data were derived from typical
insurer data.
Asset Mix: The asset mix for the model insurer was representative of
the industry average investment mix. Details on the asset mix
assumed are given in Table 7 for the base case.
Table 7
Asset Mix
Proportion
Invested
Cash
Equities
Fixed Interest
Index Bonds
Total

15%
20%
55%
10%
100%

Reinsurance: The reinsurance for each business line was based upon
typical insurer data. For the long tail lines, individual XoL con-

20

Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 12, 2005

tracts were designed to cover most of the large claims. For the
short tail lines (including fire and ISR), catastrophe XoL contracts
were designed to set the maximum event retention (MER) of the
insurer to equal $15 million.
Superimposed Inflation: The external factors that affect the run-off
claims are inflation and superimposed inflation. The inflation
level is derived from the economic model, while superimposed
inflation is modeled as a stochastic two-state process. The superimposed inflation process consists of a normal superimposed inflation state and a high superimposed inflation state, with a transition probability matrix determining the movement between these
two states. The process is described as follows: Let P denote the
transition probability matrix where Pij is the probability of moving from state i to state j, IN is the superimposed inflation rate in
the normal state, IH is the superimposed inflation rate in the high
state with

P = (POO
PIO

POI)
Pll

IN ~ U(aN,b N ) and IH ~ U(aH,b H ). Using typical insurer data,

the estimated parameter values used in the model are:
P

=

(0.9 0.1)
0.2

0.8

IN ~ U( -0.02,0.04) and IH ~ U(0.05, 0.15).

4

Assessment of the DFA model

The model was designed to broadly represent best practice in applying DFA models to capital analysis and to be consistent with the way
that practitioners would model the business lines. The parameters of
the model were set to capture the features of a typical insurer. The
model also can be assessed against APRA's Guidance Note GGN 1l0.2,
which sets out the qualitative and quantitative requirements for an internal model. The key quantitative risks that an internal model must
capture, as specified by the Guidance Note, fall under the broad categories of investment risk, insurance risk, credit risk, and operational
risk.
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TSM® is used in Prophet to capture the dynamics of the economic
market and the subsequent impact on an insurer's investment portfolio.
While no stochastic asset model currently available is perfect, TSM® is
representative of best practice in economic forecasting and assessment
of investment risk.
The Guidance Note specifies a range of risks relating to the insurance business that need to be included in the model. These risks include outstanding claims risk, premium risk, loss projection risk, concentration risk, and expense risk. Prophet allows for these risks using
the assumed variability in its three claims processes: attritional, large
and catastrophe claims. Attritional claims are assumed to follow a lognormal distribution. This assumption is common industry practice for
modeling claims. The lognormal assumption can be inadequate for capturing the true variability in claims processes, particularly when analyzing the tail-end of the distribution of claims. Modeling dependencies
between business lines with a standard (linear) covariance assumption
may not adequately capture the dependence in tail outcomes. Although
not commonly used in industry practice, copulas are an increasingly
useful method of measuring tail dependencies. Venter (2001) and Embrechts, McNeil, and Straumann (2000, Chapter 6, pp. 71-76.) provide
a good coverage of the use of copulas in modeling tail dependencies in
insurance.
The Prophet DFA model does attempt to capture the variability in
claims at the tail-end of the distribution by including separate models
for large claims and catastrophe claims. Dependencies between business lines in these tail outcomes are captured in part by the impact of
catastrophe events on multiple business lines. The catastrophe model
has a similarity to frailty models used to construct copulas. How well
the model captures the tail risk in practice is an empirical issue that
needs further research.
Concentration risk is a component of loss projection risk relating
to the uncertainty of the impact of catastrophic events. This risk is
accounted for by the catastrophe model. The excess of loss catastrophe
reinsurance assumptions in the model limit the impact of concentration
risk.
Expense risk is accounted for because claims handling expenses are
expressed as a percentage of claims incurred. Although some unexpected expense increases may be independent of the amount of claims,
there is normally a significant level of correlation between claims and
claims handling expenses. Assuming expenses and claims are perfectly
correlated results in a conservative allowance for the expense risk of the
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insurer-under circumstances in the tail when claims are higher than
expected, so too will be claims handling expenses.
Like all businesses, insurers face the credit risk that parties who owe
money to them may default. For an insurer, the key sources of credit
risk arise from their investment assets, premium receivables, and reinsurance recoveries. Credit risk relating to investment assets is implicitly covered in The Smith Model. The Prophet DFA model calibrated
in this study does not account for the risk of default in premiums or
reinsurance owed. Thus, the MCR calculated by the 1MB method using
the Prophet DFA model will not include a charge for these risks. To
compensate for this, in calculating the total MCR for the 1MB method,
the charge from the prescribed method for outstanding premiums and
reinsurance recoveries is included.
Guidance Note GGN 110.2 highlights operational risk as a quantitative risk that should be included in an insurer's capital measurement.
Operational risk, however, is a particularly difficult risk to quantify and
is an area of ongoing research in both insurance and banking. APRA's
prudential standards include a Guidance Note for operational risk, GGN
220.5, which outlines the qualitative measures an insurer should pursue to manage operational risk, but does not provide any guidance on
how to quantify the risk for capital calculation.
The Prophet DFA model calibrated in this study does not account
for operational risk. There is no well-accepted model nor sufficient data
and analysis to properly assess insurer operational risk. The prescribed
method does not have a charge for operational risk. The Basel Committee's Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk
(2001) reports that operational risk should make up 12% of a bank's
minimum required capital. Giese (2003) uses a survey of banks and
non-life insurers to report that on average banks allocate approximately
30% of their capital to operational risk, while non-life insurers allocate
approximately 16%. In the absence of an agreed approach to allocating
capital to operational risk for non-life insurers, however, it was decided
that no additional charge would be made. Given the comparative nature of this study, this assumption does not impact on the conclusions
drawn or the significance of the results.

5

Methodology

A model insurer was created to be representative of a typical large
non-life insurer operating in Australia. The Prophet DFA model was
used to project future insurance outcomes under different assump-
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tions. Six thousand (6000) simulations were performed for each set of
assumptions and used to estimate the reqnired capital to ensure a ruin
probability over a one year horizon of 0.5%. The number of simulations
was determined so that the standard error of the capital requirement
estimate was small compared to the capital amount. The capital requirement calculated by the Prophet DFA model was then compared to
the MCR under the prescribed method for the model insurer.6 A summary of the prescribed method capital charges for Australia is provided
in Tables 8 and 9.
Table 8
Outstanding Claims and Premium Liability
Capital Charges for Direct Insurers
Risk Capital Factor
Class of
Outstanding Premium
Business
Claims
Liability
Home, Motor, and Travel
9%
13.5%
11%
16.5%
F&ISR and Others
CTP, Liability, and Professional Indemnity
15%
22.5%
Notes: Motor includes commercial and domestic; Liability includes public, employer, and product liabilities; F&ISR and Others include Fire & ISR, Marine, Aviation, Consumer Credit, Mortgage, Accident.

The following five sets of assumptions were examined to assess their
impact on different types of insurers with different balance sheet structures. As the assumptions for the liability volatilities currently used
differ significantly, it was important to examine the impact of these
differences. In each case, only the assumption listed is changed from
the base case.

6See APRA GPS 110 for the insurance and investment risk capital charges.
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Table 9
Investment Capital Charges

Type of Charge
Cash and debt obligations of the commonwealth government,
an Australian state or territory government, or the national government of a foreign country where the security has a Grade 1
counterparty rating or, if not rated, the long-term foreign currency counterparty rating of that country is Grade 1; GST receivables (input tax credits);
Any debt obligation that matures or is redeemable in less than
one year with a Grade 1 or 2 rating; cash management trusts
with a Grade 1 or 2 rating;
Any other debt obligation that matures or is redeemable in one
year or more with a Grade 1 or 2 rating; reinsurance recoveries,
deferred reinsurance expenses, and other reinsurance assets
due from reinsurers with a Grade 1 or 2 counterparty rating;
Unpaid premiums due less than six months previously, unclosed business, any other debt obligation with a rating of Grade
3; reinsurance recoveries, deferred reinsurance expenses, and
other reinsurance assets due from reinsurers with a counterparty rating of Grade 3;
Any other debt obligations with a counterparty rating of Grade
4; reinsurance recoveries, deferred reinsurance expenses, and
other reinsurance assets due from reinsurers with a counterparty rating of Grade 4;
Any other debt obligations with a counterparty rating of Grade
5; reinsurance recoveries, deferred reinsurance expenses, and
other reinsurance assets due from reinsurers with a counterparty rating of Grade 5; listed equity instruments (including
subordinated debt), units in listed trusts, unpaid premiums due
more than six months previously:
Direct holdings of real estate, unlisted equity instruments (including subordinated debt), units in unlisted trusts (excluding
cash management trusts listed above), other assets not specified elsewhere in this table;
Loans to directors of the insurer or directors of related entities
(or a director's spouse), unsecured loans to employees exceeding $1,000; assets under a fixed or floating charge;
Goodwill (including any intangible components of investments
in subsidiaries), other intangible assets, future income tax benefits, assets in this category are zero weighted because they are
deducted from Tier 1 capital when calculating an insurer's capital base; see GGN 110.1.

Charge
0.5%

1.0%

2.0%

4%

6%

8%

10%

100%

0%
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1. Alternative Liability Volatility Assumptions: The model was run

using the Trowbridge volatility assumptions. This was to indicate
the sensitivity of the capital requirements to a change in volatility
based on an alternative view on the variability of business lines.
As both sets of volatility assumptions have been proposed it is of
interest to examine the resulting difference.
2. Riskier Asset Mix Assumption: The model was run with the insurer having a significantly higher proportion of investment assets in equities. This was designed to indicate the MCR required
for insurers in the industry holding significant levels of riskier
assets. This also allows a comparison of the significance of the
investment capital charge for the 1MB and prescribed methods.
3. Short Tail Insurer Assumption: The insurer was assumed to only
sell short tail business lines. Assets and liabilities were scaled
back to reflect the smaller overall insurer size, while all other assumptions remained unchanged. Because some insurers have predominantly short tail business, this will identify the significance
of the short tail capital charge for the comparison between the
1MB and prescribed methods.
4. Long Tail Insurer Assumption: The insurer was assumed to only
sell long tail business lines. Assets and liabilities were scaled back
to reflect the smaller overall insurer size, while all other assumptions remained unchanged. This will identify the significance of
the long tail capital charge. And,
5. Smaller Insurer Assumption: In this case the insurer was assumed to have premiums equal to 2.5% of the gross written premiums from the APRA statistics. The liability variability assumptions were adjusted according to the Tillinghast report to account
for the smaller business size. Assets and liabilities were also
scaled back and all other assumptions remained unchanged.
In order to compare the 1MB and prescribed methods, it is necessary
to allocate the MCR to lines of business. To do this we use a technique
adopted by practitioners. Myers and Read (2001) have proposed an
allocation of capital to lines of business based on marginal changes
in business mix. Sherris (2004) shows that, under the assumptions of
complete and frictionless markets, there is no unique capital allocation
to line of business unless an assumption about rates of return or surplus ratios also is made. In this case study we have set the liability
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parameters to generate a constant rate of return across lines of business.
A numerical estimation procedure was used to allocate capital to
line of business. The procedure was as follows:
Step 1: The size of business line 1 was reduced by 1%.
Step 2: The marginal change in the MeR was calculated, and this
amount was allocated to business line l.
Step 3: Steps 1 to 2 were repeated for business lines 2 to 5.
Step 4: Steps 1 to 3 were repeated 100 times until all the business
line sizes were reduced to zero and the MeR was reduced to
zero.
The capital allocated to each line was calculated as the sum of all of
the marginal capital allocations for each line of business. Using a 1%
reduction each time was sufficiently small so that the capital allocation
was found to be independent of which line was reduced first. In addition, the capital allocated to each line of business is such that, as an
additional small amount of each liability is added, the overall insurer
one year ruin probability is maintained. This is equivalent to using the
ruin probability for the total company as a risk measure when determining capital allocation. In other words, the capital allocated to each
line of business is such that for the insurer the overall ruin probability
is constant.

6 Capital Requirements and Model Results
6.1

Model Insurer-Base Case

The model was run for the base case assumptions. The Prophet
DFA model produced a distribution of insurance outcomes. For each of
these outcomes, the amount of assets in excess of the technical reserves
required at the start of the year to ensure that the insurer's assets are
equal to their liabilities at the end of the year was determined. This
represents a distribution of capital requirements. The Prophet MeR
was determined as the 99.5 th percentile of this distribution of capital
requirements. By taking this capital requirement, the probability that
total assets will exceed liabilities at the end of the year will be 99.5%, using the same simulations. This value was $309.4M with a standard error
of $1O.9M. The standard error was calculated using the Maritz-Jarrett
method. Details of the method for computing the standard error are
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in Wilcox (1997, Chapter 3, p. 41). The distribution of capital requirements is shown in Figure 1.

Distribution of Capital Requirements

~
~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

~

Capital Required (t=O)

Figure 1: Distribution of Base Case Prophet Capital Requirements
The results of the determination of the MCR by both the internal
model and the prescribed method are given in Table 10. As the Prophet
DFA model does not make an allowance for credit risk, the overall MCR
for the model insurer was determined as the sum of the internal model
capital requirement plus the credit risk capital charge from the prescribed method. This capital requirement is the MCR calculated under
the 1MB method and is shown in Table 10.
Table 10
Base Case Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR)
Comparison Between 1MB Method and Prescribed Method
Base Case
1MB Method
Prophet MCR
309,396,000
Adjustment for Credit Risk
28,705,000
Total MCR
338,101,000
1MB Standard Error
10,912,000
Prescribed Method
Total MCR
233,323,000
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The MCR calculated by the 1MB method was found to be significantly
larger than the MCR under the prescribed method. The MCR calculated
by the 1MB method represents the risk-based level of capital required
to ensure a ruin probability in one year of 0.5%. The prescribed method
is found to produce a capital requirement insufficient to ensure a probability of ruin over a one year time horizon of 0.5%.
To understand each method's treatment of the various risks, we
break down each of the MCRs by line of business and by risk type. The
capital charge components that make-up the prescribed method's MCR
are presented in Table 11.
Table 11
Prescribed Method MCR Capital Charges (in $1,OOOs)
Motor
Home F&ISR PbI. Liab.
CTP
Totals
Risks
Invest.
Credit
Concen.
Liabilities
OCLMS
Premium
Total

36,687
28,705
15,000
5,314
20,696

2,381
9,192

3,740
8,335

10,188
6,160

Notes: F&ISR = Fire & ISR, Pb!. Liab. = Public Liability, Invest.
Concentration, OCLMS = Outstanding Claims Liability.

69,667
17,258
=

91,290
61,640
233,323

Investment, Cone en.

Under the prescribed method, the total capital charges relating to
liability risks (outstanding claims, premium, and concentration risk)
equal $167.9M. The long tail business lines account for 61.5% of this
charge, while the short tail lines (including fire and ISR) account for
38.5% of the charge.? The Prophet internal model capital requirement
was allocated to individual business lines using the numerical approach
set out earlier. The reSUlting allocation is shown in Table 12. For the
MCR calculated by the 1MB method, long tail lines account for 67.4% of
capital while short tail lines (including fire and ISR) account for 32.6%.
Although this allocation gives a slightly higher capital weighting to long
tail lines than the prescribed method, the differences are small.
There are, however, significant differences in capital allocations for
each business line. The prescribed method allocates the same percent7The concentration risk charge is allocated only to the short tail and fire & ISR lines.

=
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Table 12
Base Case Allocation of
1MB Method MCR to Business Lines
Capital Allocated Percent
Business Line
Of Total
In $1 ,000s
28,291
9.1
Motor
Home
60,965
19.7
Fire & ISR
11,550
3.7
Public Liability
2.3
7,266
CTP
201,323
65.1
Total
309,396
100.0

age charge to both household and motor insurance. As the model insurer has approximately half the level of household insurance as motor
insurance, the prescribed method capital charge is approximately half.
The allocation of the MCR calculated by the IMB method to the household line, however, is more than double the capital allocated to the
motor line. This is due to the higher CV of 33% for household insurance vs. 22% for motor based on the Tillinghast report. The difference
between the capital allocations under the two methods is illustrated in
Figure 2.
Short Tail Allocations
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Figure 2: Relative Short Tail Capital Allocations
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In considering these allocations of capital it is worth emphasizing
that we are comparing a prescribed method with a method that was
designed to ensure an equal expected rate of return to capital across
lines of business. These differences will only be of real significance
if company management were to use these results in their business
strategy or decision making. In practice, these allocations are used for
a variety of purposes including pricing as well as decisions about which
lines of business to grow and to limit.
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Figure 3: Relative Long Tail Capital Allocations
For public liability and CTP insurance the prescribed method gives
the same allocation of capital charge percentages to each of these lines
so that the difference in the prescribed method capital charged for the
model insurer is due to the relative sizes of the business lines (51.8%
of capital is allocated to CTP with 9.7% allocated to public liability). For
the internal model allocation the capital allocated to CTP is much higher
(65.1%). For public liability it is much smaller (2.3%).
Figure 3 illustrates the differences between the capital allocations
under the two methods for the long tail lines. The difference in this
case is driven largely by the diversification effects from each line. Public liability insurance has a moderate correlation (35%) with CTP and
zero correlation with all other business lines. This results in the public
liability line providing large diversification benefits to the model insurer. CTP on the other hand is assumed to have a 50% correlation with
motor insurance so the diversification benefits to the model insurer are
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diminished and a higher level of capital, therefore, is allocated to this
line.
The prescribed method has difficulty handling correlations between
lines of business and differences in insurer business mixes. This is
a strength of the internal model, although the assumptions underlying
the correlations between business lines need to be considered carefully.

6.2

Alternative Assumptions

Table 13 summarizes the results from the alternative assumptions.
The table shows the capital requirements from the 1MB and prescribed
methods for the base case and for each of the alternative assumptions.
6.2.1

Alternative Volatility Assumptions

Adopting the lower CVs from the Trowbridge report dramatically
reduces the MCR calculated under the 1MB method by $214.8M. The
internal model results are extremely sensitive to the volatility assumptions for the insurance liabilities. An insurer who uses the Trowbridge
CVs for the volatility of their business will require an MeR under the
1MB method that is Significantly lower than the MCR calculated under
the prescribed method. Without an extensive study of liability volatility
to validate these assumptions, it is open to insurers who can use the
internal model approach to adopt volatility assumptions in line with
these levels.
6.2.2

Riskier Asset Mix

As expected, the MCR under both the 1MB and prescribed methods increase when the insurer's proportion of invested assets in equities is increased to 80%. There is a difference in increase for each
method, however. Under the 1MB method, the MCR increases by $61.0M,
while under the prescribed method the increase was much less at only
$49.0M. The capital charge for equities in the prescribed method may
not be sufficient to allow for the impact of these securities on ruin probabilities. 8 Because asset risk, especially asset mismatch risk, is a major
risk run by insurers, a prescribed method should not encourage insurers to adopt a riskier investment strategy. The above result suggests
that the prescribed method in Australia may have an incentive for insurers to invest in equities.
8This is based on the assumption that TSM@ is a realistic model of asset returns.

W
N

Table 13
Summary of MCR Comparisons for Alternative Assumptions
Prescribed Method MCR Capital Charges in $l,OOOs
Trowbridge
Tail Only
Base
80%
Small
Long
Case
CV
Equities
Short
Insurer
1MB Method
Prophet
Credit Risk
Total
Standard Error
Prescribed Method
Investment Risk
Credit Risk
OSC Liability
Premium Liability
Concentration

'0

309,396
28,705
338,101
10,912

94,586
28,705
123,291
3,469

370,414
28,705
399,119
13,517

209,196
10,745
219,941
5,221

228,828
12,513
241,341
9,056

36,391
28,705
91,290
61,641
61,641

36,391
28,705
88,237
59,415
59,415

85,366
28,705
91,290
61,641
61,641

9,517
10,745
7,890
30,885
30,885

22,656
12,513
80,999
23,789
23,789

139,951
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145,528
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It is interesting to note that had the Trowbridge CV assumptions
been used, then changing the asset mix from 20% equities to 80% equities would have increased the MCR by a greater amount of $83.7M.
The reason for the larger increase under the Trowbridge assumptions
is related to the relative size of the various risks and their impact on
ruin probability.
The Trowbridge assumptions have lower insurance liability volatility, so that fewer of the outcomes at the 99.5 th percentile of the capital
required distribution are due to high claims costs. Instead, the outcomes at the 99.5 th percentile are more often due to low asset returns.
This leads to a higher proportion of the overall capital under the 1MB
method being attributed to asset risk when insurer liability volatility assumptions are lower. This in turn creates a greater disparity between
the prescribed method's and 1MB method's charges for asset risk.

6.2.3

Short Tail Insurer

Removing the long tail lines from the insurer reduces the overall
insurer's size along with the MCR. Under the 1MB method the MCR reduces by $1l8.2M, while under the prescribed method the reduction is
significantly larger at $159.3M. The internal model allocates more capital to each of the insurer's liabilities than is charged by the prescribed
method. Rather than comparing absolute changes in MCR, it is more
interesting to compare the relative changes. The same will hold for the
long tail and small insurer scenarios.
Figure 4 illustrates the MCRs under the different assumptions relative to the base case. For the short tail insurer, the 1MB method has
a reduction in its MCR of 65% of its original size, while under the prescribed method the MCR reduces to 32% of its original size. The internal model is allocating a greater amount of capital to a purely short tail
insurer compared to the prescribed method. The reasons for this highlight some further shortcomings of the prescribed method. By reducing
the number of lines of business, diversification benefits are lost. This
is accounted for in the 1MB method but not by the prescribed method,
which has constant capital charges independent of the business mix.
The result is that the capital calculated under the 1MB method is higher
than under the prescribed method.
The short tail capital charges (relative to other capital charges) under the prescribed method also may charge less for the risk of those
lines than the internal model. This would be consistent with Collings's
(2001) finding that as an insurer increases its business mix with short
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Figure 4: Alternative Assumptions MCRs as Percentage of Base Case
taillines,9 it will have a relatively larger capital increase under the 1MB
method than the prescribed method.
This means that insurers will have an incentive to write short tail
lines if they are using the prescribed method. If there is a relative advantage in capital required for short tail lines, this also may lead to
underpricing of these lines.
6.2.4

Long Tail Insurer

In Figure 4 we note that the MCR calculated by the 1MB method reduces to 71% of its original size, while under the prescribed method the
MCR reduces to 60% of its original size for the case of a long tail insurer.
The internal model allocates a higher level of capital to a purely long
tail insurer than the prescribed method.
The same two effects as for the short tail insurer appear to apply
to the case of the long tail insurer. Once again there is a loss of some
diversification benefits for the purely long tail insurer leading to the
higher relative MCR under the 1MB method than under the prescribed
method. The long tail capital charges (relative to other capital charges)
under the prescribed method charge less for the risk of those lines than
the internal model. This is inconsistent with Collings (2001) findings
9Collings (2001) used motor insurance as an example of a short tail line.

Sutherland-Wong and Sherris: Risk-Based Regulatory Capital

35

that increasing the business mix with long taillines 10 led to a greater
relative MCR under the prescribed method than under the 1MB method.
Regardless of the relative impact of long tail lines of business, however, it is clear that the prescribed method can not deal adequately with
differences among business mix of insurers. Applying the prescribed
method will lead to incentives for insurers to change their business mix
to optimize their regulatory capital position. Lines of business with too
low capital charges will be increased, leading to potential price cuts that
can not be justified if proper risk allowance were to be made.
6.2.5

Small Insurer

Figure 4 also shows the effect of changing the size of the insurer. In
this case the insurer is assumed to reduce to 25% of its original size.
Under the prescribed method, the MCR reduced by a similar amount to
32% of its original size.1 1 The percentage capital charges under the prescribed method are independent of insurer size. For the 1MB method,
while the size of the insurer decreased, the overall volatility of each of
the business lines is assumed to increase. This is based on the assumption that smaller business portfolios have greater independent variance
and that pooling of insurer risks reduces relative volatility within a class
of business. The volatility assumptions in an internal model should depend on the size of the business line, with higher volatility assumed for
smaller lines. The overall MCR under the 1MB method reduced to 43%
of its original size.

7
7.1

Risk-Based Capital Regulation of Insurers
Impact of Volatility Assumptions

Our results show a strong dependence of an internal model's output
on the insurance liability's volatility assumptions. Of all the sensitivities performed, the greatest change in MCR resulted from changing
from the original Tillinghast insurance liability CVs to the Trowbridge
CVs.
Insurers would be expected to prefer to have a lower regulatory capital requirement. Insurers in the industry that have liability volatility
lOCollings (2001) used public liability insurance as an example of a long tail line.
llThe MCR under the prescribed method did not reduce to 25% of its original size
because the risk margins for a smaller insurer are higher and the concentration charge
was assumed to remain constant at $15M.
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similar to the Tillinghast CVs are unlikely to adopt an internal model to
calculate their MCR. Insurers that have liability volatility similar to the
Trowbridge CVs have an incentive to adopt an internal model to lower
their MCR. As yet no insurer in Australia has elected to use an internal
model-based approach. This may be for a number of reasons. One of
these could be that the prescribed method produces lower capital requirements than would be required if they were to adopt an internal
model. If this were the case, then those insurers who use these levels of capital to price their insurance contracts could be undercharging
compared to the premium rate required to generate the level of ruin
probability considered appropriate by APRA using the internal model
approach.
The importance of the assumed CVs in determining an insurer's MCR
indicates a clear need for an assessment of the level of volatility across
business lines and an understanding as to how this varies across companies. Thomson (2003) commented on APRA's disappointment with
the general lack of justification by actuaries in the risk margins they
adopted for their first reporting under the new APRA requirements. It
appears that Australian insurers have yet to understand fully the true
level of volatility in their businesses and have yet to reach agreement
on best practice in calculating volatility. This is expected to be an important issue for any regulator to address, regardless of country, in the
introduction of risk-based regulatory capital requirements.

7.2

Issues with the Prescribed Method

Considering the results in Figure 4, it is evident that the prescribed
method does not prescribe a level of capital that is adequate to ensure
a ruin probability of 0.5% for all insurers, regardless of size or mix of
business. This is based on the presumption that the internal model
used in this study represents an insurer's realistic business situation.
The model used has been developed to be close to the realistic situation
and reflects industry best practice. The MCR calculated by the internal
model should be representative of the actual level of capital required to
ensure a ruin probability in one year of 0.5%. Although the IAA Insurer
Solvency Assessment Working Party (2004) state that the prescribed
method should be conservative to make sure that it is representative of
all insurers that conduct business, in the Australian general insurance
industry this does not appear to be the case.
An important part of implementing the risk-based capital requirements is the calibration of the prescribed method capital charges. APRA
calibrated the current capital charges at an industry-wide level so that
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the total MCR of the industry increased by a factor of 1.4 to 1.5 times the
previous level. This was a substantial increase in capital requirements
across the industry. The impact of the changes differs between insurers
depending on their experience relative to the industry. Insurers with
lower volatility experience are effectively treated the same as those with
higher volatility experience. Even if the charges are adequate for the
average insurer, they may be inadequate for insurers with greater than
average volatility. Assuming APRA wants to secure an industry-wide
solvency requirement of a 0.5% ruin probability in one year, then it will
need to increase the prescribed capital charges for insurance liabilities.
Given that the last change in regulatory requirements increased the capital requirement in the industry by around 50%, a further increase is a
politically contentious issue.
This is the situation that is likely to face many regulators at an international level when they consider the introduction of these risk-based
capital requirements. There are likely to be poorly capitalizedinsurers
that will no longer be able to operate under these more stringent requirements. At the same time capital strong insurers will be expected
to meet the requirements. Given the difficult capital situation that has
been faced by the insurance industry at an international level, the adoption of risk-based capital for insurers may take longer and require more
attention to capital-weak insurers than otherwise.
An important issue for the Australian regulator will be to consider
the liability capital charges that should be increased and to what extent.
Collings (2001) found that short tail lines had a relatively higher capital
requirement under the 1MB method compared to the prescribed method
and vice versa for long tail lines. While the results from this study are
broadly consistent with this, the differences between long tail and short
lines are less distinct.
At an individual line level, our internal capital allocation showed that
the household line was allocated a significantly larger amount of capital
than the motor line. This was driven by the higher CV assumption
for household from the Tillinghast report. Differences in household
and motor volatility suggest that it is inappropriate for household and
motor to have identical capital charges.
Differences in the capital allocations between CTP and public liability were assumed to be driven largely by diversification effects. Smaller
insurers and insurers with less diversified business mixes are undercharged under the prescribed method to a greater extent than larger
and well-diversified insurers. This strongly indicates the need to include diversification benefits in the capital requirements, concentration
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charges for less diversified insurers, or varying capital charges based
upon business size.
Further sophistication to the prescribed method must be weighed
against the benefits of simplicity in the method. It is clear, however, that
using a prescribed method that is out of line with the actual risk-based
capital requirements will produce incentives for insurers to behave out
of line with the economics of the business. This is a critical issue if
this approach leads to an incentive for insurers to underprice or grow
riskier business lines.

7.3

Investment Risk Capital Charges

Our results demonstrated that the capital required for higher levels
of equity investment was greater under the 1MB method than under the
prescribed method. The prescribed capital charge for equities under
the model assumptions is insufficient to cover the risk This is consistent with the findings of Collings (2001) that the prescribed method
is less responsive to increases in equity investment than is the 1MB
method. An adequate charge to cover equity risk at the 99.5 th percentile would need to be larger than the current prescribed charge of
8%,12 particularly for insurers with investment portfolios that are not
well diversified.
On the asset side, the prescribed method provides little incentive for
insurers with a well-diversified investment portfolio. As an example to
illustrate this point consider the property investment capital charge.
The capital charge for property investment is 10%, while the capital
charge for listed equity is 8%. For insurers that perceive there to be
relatively higher risk-adjusted returns to be gained from equity than
from property, there is an incentive to overweight their investment in
equity. This is despite the fact that there can often be considerable diversification benefits of holding equity and property together. Collings
(2001) provides another example by considering the diversification and
immunization benefits of holding appropriate amounts of government
bonds and cash. While there is an optimal amount of each of these securities to hold that minimizes overall volatility for the insurer, the capital
charges under the prescribed method do not distinguish between the
two asset classes and charge a constant amount of 0.5%.
In order to ensure the MCR under the prescribed method provides
an industry-wide solvency requirement of a 0.5% ruin probability in
one year, APRA will need to change the investment capital charges.
12 8%

is the prescribed capital charge for listed equity securities.
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For risky assets such as equity, the current capital charges should be
increased. APRA also should provide inc~ntives for insurers to hold
well-diversified asset portfolios. This could be achieved by offering
diversification discounts or alternatively a more stringent investment
concentration charge. 13

7.4

Incentive to Use an Internal Model

The opening section of APRA's capital standards states that APRA
encourages insurers with sufficient resources to adopt an internal model
for calculation of their MCR. APRA has a desire for insurers to begin to
adopt the 1MB method in line with its aim for insurers to more closely
match their capital requirements with their individual risk characteristics. The results of the analysis of the capital requirements that we
have undertaken indicate that there is no incentive to adopt the 1MB
method, especially if an insurer has insurance liability CVs in line with
the Tillinghast report. The prescribed method's capital charges would
need to increase to the extent that the internal model would produce a
lower MCR. Alternatively there needs to be a much closer examination
of the volatility of insurer liabilities and a more careful calibration of
the prescribed method capital charges.
There are other reasons why insurers would not adopt an internal
model for the MCR calculation. Even though risk management and measurement techniques in non-life (property and casualty) insurance have
vastly improved over the last decade and DFA modeling has become an
important part of internal management for many large insurers, developments in these areas are still occurring. The 1MB method requires an
internal model with a very high degree of sophistication to adequately
address all the material risks of an insurer and their complex interrelationships. There also needs to be the actuarial and risk management
human resource skills to ensure proper implementation and interpretation of results. The internal model used in this study was based on simplifying assumptions, and the internal model for a real-world insurer
would be far more complex. Even with an adequate internal model, the
assumptions required in the model need far more careful attention. A
greater understanding and consensus of the underlying volatility of insurance liabilities is a major requirement for non-life insurers in order
to adopt an internal model for MCR calculation.
Even as actuaries develop the necessary skills and capabilities to
adequately implement an internal model for the 1MB method, there will
13The current investment concentration charge only applies to Grades 4 and 5 debt
and does not apply to concentrated holdings in other securities.
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no doubt exist further obstacles from other stakeholders in the general
insurance industry. The black-box stigma attached to internal models
is likely to be an area that actuaries will need to overcome in order to
convince general insurance senior management and the regulators to
trust the internal model's output for management purposes and MCR
calculation.
Industry experts have identified another obstacle to the 1MB method.
Financial analysts involved in the trading of general insurance company
shares may not have the confidence in the insurer's management to
rely on them determining their own regulatory capital requirements.
Financial analysts may not be willing to rely upon the MCR calculated
under the 1MB method.
Differences in approaches to internal modeling also may make it
difficult to compare the MCR output from one insurer's internal model
with another insurer. Comparison across different insurers is important for regulatory reasons and to avoid opportunistic insurers taking advantage of differences in models. Financial analysts and regulators may prefer to make MCR comparisons based upon the prescribed
method where the formula is fixed and insurer judgment does not
impact the results. This leaves open the need to develop prescribed
method charges that are more risk-based.

8
8.1

Closing Comments
Summary and Conclusions

The IAA Insurer Solvency Assessment Working Party (2004) has advocated two methods for non-life insurers to calculate their capital
requirement: the standard approach and the advanced approach. In
Australia, these dual capital requirements are known as the prescribed
method and the 1MB method. This study explores the implications of
these new capital requirements.
From APRA's perspective, the aim is to meet a regulatory objective
of requiring that insurers hold a level of capital to ensure a minimum
ruin probability across the industry. It is important that the prescribed
method adequately charges risks to meet this objective for all non-life
insurers licensed to do business in Australia.
This study compared the MCRs calculated under the two methods
and analyzed the prescribed method's capital charges using a model
representative of industry best practice. Despite this, simplifying as-

Sutherland-Wong and Sherris: Risk-Based Regulatory Capital

41

sumptions were made in the model's calibration. A lack of consensus
remains as to the insurance liability volatility assumptions.
The results of this study, however, have highlighted some significant
issues for both regulators and insurers. For the model insurer studied,
the MeR calculated under the 1MB method was significantly larger than
the MeR under the prescribed method. The implication of this result
is that despite APRA's desire for insurers to adopt an internal model
for MeR calculation, there is an incentive for insurers to use the prescribed method to produce a lower MeR. This also highlights the need
to develop prescribed methods that are consistent with the underlying
risk of the insurer. To do this, the need for a diversification allowance
is very important.
The results were shown to be highly sensitive to the insurance liability volatility assumptions. It is arguable, however, that the current
capital charge levels in Australia are too low in order for the prescribed
method to ensure a ruin probability in one year of less than 0.5% across
the entire general insurance industry. This is likely to be very difficult
to achieve. Differences between insurers of different sizes and with different business mixes should at least be considered more carefully in
any revision of the prescribed method capital charges.
There is a strong case for including either diversification benefits or
more stringent concentration charges in the prescribed method to address the risk reduction associated with a well diversified business mix
and asset portfolio and to give a more consistent treatment of insurers
with different characteristics.
The internal model's results rely heavily on its volatility assumptions. There is a major need for a study to be carried out using insurer
level data to develop a consensus in the industry as to the level of insurance liability volatility that should be allowed in internal models for
capital determination.
We can only conclude that there is much to be done by regulators
and insurers if they are to adopt risk-based capital requirements. Some
countries have taken a step along this path already. Australia has been
one of the first countries to introduce a risk-based regulatory regime
for non-life insurers, and its experience is no doubt of great interest to
insurers, actuaries and regulators internationally. We have analyzed the
capital requirements with a view to identifying lessons for others. There
is still a long way to go before insurers will be in a position to confidently
adopt the 1MB method for the MeR calculation even in Australia.
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Areas for Further Research

Our results depend to some extent on the degree to which the model
and the assumptions used are representative of actual insurers. Our
aim has been to use an internal model that broadly represents the insurer's business situation and parameters and assumptions based on
industry best practice. We would expect any insurer that used a model
similar to the one that we have used for the 1MB approach would come
to similar conclusions.
In this study, many simplifying assumptions were made in the model's
calibration. We are not aware of any comprehensive study that has been
completed that examines and assesses the appropriate insurance liability volatility assumptions taking into account actual insurer data and
allowing for insurer-specific characteristics. This is a critical area of research required for risk-based regulatory capital if internal models are
to be used with any confidence.
The modeling of claims correlation is another important area for
further research. Dependency models need to be further considered.
Brehm (2002) outlines a formal quantitative approach for estimating
correlation from data. The Tillinghast and Trowbridge reports use a
much more qualitative approach. Copulas also have great potential for
modeling insurance liability dependencies, especially for tail events.
Despite these issues, the case study presented here identifies the issues and gives guidance for any insurer considering internal modeling
for risk-based capital. There are important lessons at an international
level because the approach adopted in Australia is similar to that proposed at the international level.
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